Tuesday June 13, 2006

Column:

Political unrest, much like military unrest, has been brewing in the Palestinian Authority for quite some time. Hamas versus Fatah. Fatah versus Hamas. And now, accusations and counter accusations are popping up all over. I'd say that Palestinian politics is beginning to percolate.

President Abbas is pushing through a Referendum. The Referendum Abbas wants asserts that Palestinian will live side by side with Israel. Hamas refuses - unequivocally, to accept the principle of living Israelis, let alone of Palestinians living side-by-side with Israelis.

Hamas refuses to even call the Referendum a Referendum. Instead, they call the Referendum and the document Palestinians would be voting on a "declaration of a coup against the government." They have called the entire issue illegal.

Technically, officially, the Referendum is named the National Reconciliation Document but it is also being referred to by a much more popular title. Because the document was composed by five Palestinians sitting in Israel's Hadari prison, the Palestinian press has dubbed it the Prisoner's Document. The most senior designer of the document is prisoner Marwan Bargouti, secretary general of Fatah. Another senior contributor is Abdel Halek Natshe, a leader of Hamas. Prison, at least Israeli prison, seems to be the great Palestinian equalizer.

The document itself contains eighteen points. The most significant point, the point that Hamas finds it hardest to accept, recognizes Israel within the '67 borders. On that issue the document is unbending. The document continues with a point long held by Secretary General Bargouti, long before he became one of Israel's most highly-placed prisoners. It rejects attacks on Israelis within the '67 borders and welcomes attacks on settlers over the border.

The document is overwhelming supported by the Palestinian masses. When it goes to Referendum it will win a significant victory. And a victory for the Referendum is a definite defeat for Hamas.

Hamas does not want to be ousted from office. Hamas is taking the challenge seriously. Hamas has begun a counter-campaign. They have pressured the Hamas and Islamic Jihad prisoners who signed and developed the document to withdrawn their names and their support. The prisoner/signees now claim that the paper they wrote was never meant as a political document intended for Referendum. They claim that President Abbas has co-opted the document and manipulated it. They claim that the President's actions are an "unacceptable abuse" of the document. The Palestinians are facing off in what appears to be a case of the (tea)kettle calling the (coffee)pot black.

For his part, Abbas has the overwhelming support of the masses, the Palestinian Street. Abbas says that there is no legal problem with the Referendum. According to Abbas "There is no article in the basic law that says a referendum is not allowed. It states that the people are the source of all power." He said that "As chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and president of the Palestinian Authority, I have decided to exercise my constitutional right and duty to hold a Referendum over the Document of National Reconciliation."

In order to legally halt the Referendum, Hamas would have to stop it in the Palestinian Parliament. According to Palestinian law, that would require a two-thirds Parliamentary majority. The chances of Hamas swaying Parliament is highly unlikely. Hamas has only 74 of 132 Parliamentary seats, which translates into only slightly over a 50% majority. And that is why Hamas is trying to defeat the Referendum by turning it upside-down and inside-out.

Hamas is putting the blame on Abbas, challenging his authority for doing something "illegal." The Hamas counter-attack is not working.

Palestinians are witnessing the beginning of the end of Hamas in power. Just as they voted Hamas in, they are - through the Referendum - preparing to vote Hamas out. Because after the referendum will come elections.

And while Israel has long awaited the political downfall of Hamas, this is not the way they would have chosen to put Hamas out of power. The success of the Referendum has a definite downside for Israel.

Palestinian acceptance of the Referendum will mean a shift in pressure forcing Israel to offer serious concessions. Essentially, the language in the document concerning the '67 borders is very, very strong. There is no possibility for compromise on the issue of borders and the 1967 Green Line. The original document had to be firm. Otherwise, it would never have been written and never have been accepted by the Palestinian people.

Good news for the Palestinians, bad news for the Israelis