Monday December 4, 2006

Column:

Bottom line: The White House needs to move forward with their Iraq Policy. The White House needs to move forward quickly. The White House needs to be snappy. They need to say" Snap to it Iraq. This is what must be done and this is what will be done.

Otherwise, Iraq will languish in a state of semi-democratic-stupor. Otherwise, the people of Iraq will continue to suffer the misguided and self-interested rule of a leader who is out of his depth and not in control of his country.

The face-to-face meeting that took place between the president of the United States and the prime minister of Iraq has been analyzed, re-analyzed and over analyzed. In my estimation, it has also been mis-analyzed. Body language, eye contact, facial expressions, hugs and hand gestures - they are all beside the point. In my estimation, not only have the analysts missed the point of this meeting, but so did the White House.

This should not have been a meeting infused with innuendo and suggestion. It should not have only been a face-to-face meeting but also an in-your-face meeting. The United States should have been calling the shots and the Iraqis should now be snapping to.

But the Iraqis could not hear what the United States was saying because the United States did not do the proper homework. The United States misused language. Rather than inspiring and invigorating the Iraqi government, the United States turned the Iraqis off and the Iraqis tuned the United States out.

Bottom line: The United States messed up. The intention was well-placed and appropriate, the execution was way off the mark. The United States made two major mistakes.

Mistake # 1: The Middle East is a slow moving region. The president of the United States thought that he was moving with the Mid East flow by dealing calmly and warmly with the Iraqi. But calm and warm translates into meek in Maliki-speak. Decisive and snappy is understood by Maliki. Decisive and snappy is the style of despots and dictators. Maliki respects despots and dictators.

Mistake # 2: George Bush came to Iraq speaking of a "Partition Plan." The plan, the idea, is actually very good. The choice of wording is abominable. As soon as the word "partition" fell from the lips of George Bush the conversation was over. Red flags were flying. Maliki never can and never will agree to a Partition Plan.

In the Middle East the word "partition" resonates with Western imperialism and Arab oppression. In the Middle East partition is synonymous with the Israeli Palestinian conflict and smacks of British Colonial influences. For Iraqis partition is the wrong word. The connotation is terrible, just terrible. What was the United States thinking?

Instead of "partition" the United States should be using the word "provinces." In Iraq, provinces already exist. Iraqi provinces are actually tribally based and have a long history, predating 1922 and the modern state of Iraq. Even under Saddam the provinces were strong and well organized providing important local government services and functioning in an efficient - albeit biased and oppressive, way. And then Saddam pounded everyone into submission on a national level. Under Maliki revitalized and newly-empowered provinces could function as strong local governments.

If "provinces" did not sit well with the United States, if they wanted to introduce a new concept rather than rework an existing condition there is another neutral term that could be used. The United States could model a plan on the concept of the "canton." It works for the Swiss and what country is more neutral than Switzerland?! Province, canton - terms that carry no emotional Arab baggage, plans that with only the slightest tweaking would be workable, manageable, doable.

Personally, of course, Maliki would have a problem with any plan that stripped him of power. The province concept neuters the prime minister. It takes away his strength and his prowess. No Middle East leader wants to be told or shown that he is too weak to control his people. The province system would by definition weaken the national system and empower local governments and police authority. Powerful provinces will wrestle power from Maliki and place it in the hands local leaders. In some provinces that means giving power to monitories like Kurds and Sunnis.

Moving to a weaker central government implies weakening Maliki politically. It will diminish Maliki and that is a situation he will not countenance. But it is the best plan for the people of Iraq. Maliki can handle a coup, he can handle being ousted in a new election. But he cannot allow himself to be removed by the very power that orchestrated his rise to power. That is too much to ask of the Middle Eastern male ego. It is the ultimate insult. It would be a sign of his failure and would necessitate his resignation. It would be humiliation on the national - and international, level.

At this stage Maliki is the democratically elected prime minister of Iraq but he is not acting in the best interests of Iraq. Like so many other politicians he is acting to preserve his role and his position and his constituency. That is not what Iraq needs right now.

Bottom line: If Maliki does not snap to, he must be forced out.